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ENFORCEMENT OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LICENSES:
THE MDY TRIO’S INCONVENIENT COMPLICATIONS
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz*
14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106 (2011)
ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Jacobsen v. Katzer finally settled
the question of whether open source licenses are enforceable.
Unfortunately, three recent cases from the Ninth Circuit have
complicated matters. I call this trio of cases the “MDY Trio” in
honor of the Ninth Circuit’s prior trio of licensing cases known as
the “MAI Trio.” On the surface, the MDY Trio provides a boost
for the enforceability of software licenses, but the MDY Trio also
creates two significant complications for open source licenses.
First, the MDY Trio’s test for distinguishing between licenses and
copyright “first sales” does not fit open source licenses. Second,
the MDY Trio’s method of delineating between contractual
covenants and license conditions will prevent many open source
licensors from obtaining injunctive relief. This complication is
particularly dire because injunctive relief is the most critical
remedy in enforcing open source licenses. My article proposes a
modification to the MDY Trio’s test for determining whether a
transaction is a license or first sale that better fits open source
licenses. The article also proposes a more effective approach to
distinguishing between contractual covenants and license
conditions by focusing on remedies. My alternative approach
capitalizes on the experience of trial courts in granting injunctive
relief, serves the public policies underlying copyright and contract
law, and better fits open source licenses. Given the importance of
licensing as a transaction model in the information economy, other
federal courts soon will be deciding whether to follow or diverge
from the MDY Trio’s lead in future licensing cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past, if a software “hacker”1 happened to meet an
American lawyer, the first question the hacker would ask the
lawyer is this: “Are open source software licenses enforceable in
the United States?” Lawyers usually gave three answers to that
question. First, since courts in the United States enforced other
types of mass-market software licenses, a lawyer might say that
surely courts would enforce open source licenses as well. Second,
a lawyer might say that some courts outside the United States
enforced them. And finally, a lawyer might say that because people
are abiding by the terms of open source licenses as if they were
enforceable, for all intents and purposes the licenses are selfenforcing. These answers seldom satisfied software hackers who
retorted, “Give me a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer!” Now lawyers can
give a clear “yes” answer, thanks to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit’s ruling in Jacobsen v. Katzer.2 Or at least lawyers
could until three recent cases decided by a single 3 judge panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Vernor v. Autodesk,
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, and UMG Recordings
v. Augusto.3 I call these cases the “MDY Trio”4 to honor the Ninth
Circuit’s prior trio of licensing cases known as the “MAI Trio” (so
named for the MAI Systems v. Peak Computer case5).
Vernor v. Autodesk arose when Autodesk attempted to
enforce a software license prohibiting the resale of copies of its
AutoCAD software. MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment
focused on Blizzard Entertainment’s attempt to enforce its
software license and on-line terms of use that prohibited gamers
from deploying robots to play the World of Warcraft game for
them in order to move up game levels. UMG Recordings v.
Augusto involved an attempt by a music record company to
enforce an “evaluation only” condition that accompanied music
1

Software developers with a passion for programming are called “hackers.” See
THE NEW HACKER’S DICTIONARY 233-34 (3d ed. 1996). In common parlance
the word hacker often refers to programmers who create software viruses and
worms but among serious programmers the term carries a positive connotation
as in “I’m hacking some code to fix that bug.” See id. at 234; STEVEN LEVY,
HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984).
2
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
3
Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); MDY Industries v.
Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings v.
Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2010). The three judges siting on the panel
were William C. Canby, Jr., Consuelo M. Callahan, and Sandra S. Ikuta.
4
“MDY,” of course, refers to MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment.
5
991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1995). The other two cases in the trio are Wall Data,
Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006) and
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
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CDs sent unsolicited by the record company to professional music
reviewers.
The Ninth Circuit panel released the Vernor decision first.
In enforcing Autodesk’s software license, the court articulated a
new test for determining when a transaction should be
characterized as a license and when it should be characterized as a
Copyright Act “first sale.” The Ninth Circuit panel released the
MDY decision next. In MDY, the court applied the Vernor test and
ruled that Blizzard Entertainment had licensed its game software
rather than sold a copy of it.6 The MDY court then turned its
attention to the actual license terms to decide whether the court
would grant injunctive relief for breach of the license. This
determination rested on whether a given license term could be
characterized as a “condition” on the grant of copyrights or,
instead, a run-of-the-mill contractual covenant. The court’s MDY
opinion articulated a new test for evaluating whether a license term
is a license condition or, instead, a contractual covenant. Last, the
panel released the Augusto decision. In a relatively brief opinion,
the court simply applied the Vernor test to hold that the transaction
amounted to a Copyright Act first sale rather than a license, based
on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The MDY Trio addresses two important issues in software
licensing. First, it addresses the issue of when a software
transaction should be characterized as a Copyright Act “first sale”7
and when it should be characterized as a “license.”8 This
determination affects the software user’s right to use or redistribute
a software copy that he or she acquired. If a transaction is a
license, then the software user must abide by the scope of use and
distribution described in the license agreement; if the transaction is
a first sale, then the user can ignore any such restrictions on use or
distribution of the copy. Second, even if a software transaction
qualifies as a license, certain terms of the license can be
characterized as contractual covenants and other terms as license
6

Even though this Article points out the importance of the MDY Industries case
in the context of software licensing, it is equally notable for its application of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act in a manner that differs from the Federal
Circuit’s approach in Chamberlin Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178
(Fed. Cir. 2004) and Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware, 421 F.3d 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2005). See also Jessica Gallegos, Note, A New Role for Tortious
Interference in the Digital Age: A Model to Enforce End User License
Agreements, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 411 (2011) (discussing MDY’s treatment of
tortious interference with contract).
7
See 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (2006).
8
See generally JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999);
ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING (1999); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF
C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING (2005); XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, ROBERT W.
GOMULKIEWICZ & DANIELLE M. CONWAY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
SOFTWARE & INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW & PRACTICE (2006).
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conditions. This characterization affects the remedies available for
breach of the license contract. If a licensee violates a covenant,
then the licensee is liable to pay damages for breach of contract;
however, if the licensee violates a license condition, then this
breach may also infringe the licensor’s rights under the Copyright
Act, giving the licensor the ability to obtain injunctive relief.
On the surface, the MDY Trio appears to provide a boost for
the enforceability of software licenses. Some commentators have
argued that most end user software transactions should be treated
categorically as first sales rather than (to use software industry
parlance) End User License Agreements (“EULAs”), but the MDY
Trio rejects that argument. The MDY Trio, like most software
licensing cases in the United States, upholds a software
developer’s ability to choose mass-market end user licensing as a
transaction model. Indeed, open source licensing is one of the most
valuable software licensing practices that benefits from a policy
that upholds licensing as a transaction model. As articulated by the
Federal Circuit in Jacobsen v. Katzer, “Open source licensing has
become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves
to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few
could have imagined just a few decades ago.”9
Below the surface, however, the MDY Trio creates
inconvenient complications for open source licensing. First, the
MDY Trio’s test that distinguishes between licenses and copyright
first sales does not fit open source licensing because it focuses too
much on use and transfer restrictions, neither of which are present
in open source licenses. Under the MDY Trio’s test, many popular
open source licenses such the GNU General Public License
(“GPL”) will not qualify as licenses. Second (and more dire), the
MDY Trio’s method of delineating between contractual covenants
and license conditions will prove problematic for open source
licensing, depriving open source licensors of the ability to obtain
injunctive relief for breach of key open source licensing terms. For
example, the all-important “share alike” term in the GPL may not
qualify as a license condition. Consequently, a GPL licensor’s only
useful remedy—injunctive relief—would not be available if a
licensee fails to “share alike.”
This Article argues that the best way to reconcile the MDY
Trio’s license/first sale test with open source licensing is to read
the test as one way, but not the only way, to prove that a
transaction is a license. In other words, if a transaction meets the
test it certainly qualifies as a license; however, there may be other
9

535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “There are substantial benefits,
including economic benefits, to the creation and distribution of copyrighted
works under public licenses that range far beyond traditional license royalties.”
Id. at 1379.
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ways to demonstrate that a transaction is a license, such as by
showing that the user received permission to exercise more
copyrights than the user would have under a first sale. If the user
gets more rights, as the user naturally would under an open source
license, then the transaction is not a first sale.
This Article also critiques the MDY Trio’s test for
determining whether a particular term in a license should be
deemed a contractual covenant rather than a license condition. In
particular, it argues that the MDY Trio’s test puts trial courts in the
difficult position of drawing critical bright lines based on sketchy
criteria, namely whether a purported condition has a “nexus” with
or “grounding” in an exclusive copyright. Instead, the Article
proposes shifting the analysis to the remedies aspect of the case,
where the court is better situated to consider the “nexus” and
“grounding” factors along with other important factors such as
whether granting injunctive relief would promote copyright and
contract-related policies. In other words, since the
condition/covenant distinction really only matters as it relates to
the availability of injunctive relief, it is better to focus there. This
approach also capitalizes on trial courts’ experience in weighing a
variety of facts and circumstances in granting injunctive relief.
Depending on the strength of the licensor’s showing that granting
relief meets various licensing-related equitable factors, especially
the factors highlighted in the MDY Trio and whether granting relief
advances the public policies underlying contract and copyright
law, then the trial court could grant (or refuse to grant) injunctive
relief as appropriate to a particular license transaction. This sliding
scale approach works better for all software licenses but especially
open source licenses. The impact can be illustrated by using an
example from the GPL. In a dispute between two sophisticated
hackers, if the trial court finds a breach of the “share alike”
obligation of the GPL, the court would be likely to grant injunctive
relief using this Article’s approach; using the MDY Trio’s test, it
would not.
Section I of the Article provides a general description of
open source licensing, including the importance of injunctive relief
as a remedy for breach of open source licenses. Section II
describes the debate about whether software transactions should be
characterized as licenses or first sales and the implications of the
characterization, the MDY Trio’s approach to delineating between
the two, the complications this approach creates for open source
licensing because of the court’s focus on use and distribution
restrictions, and my analysis for reading the MDY Trio’s test in a
manner that better fits open source licensing. Section III delves
into the distinction between contractual covenants and license
conditions, the implications this distinction has for injunction
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remedies, the MDY Trio’s approach to making the distinction,
which forces a trial court to identify a clear boundary based on
relatively sketchy criteria, and my proposal for an alternative
approach which deploys the court’s test (along with other criteria)
in a more useful fashion and in a more appropriate setting—at the
remedies phase of a case.
I.

OPEN SOURCE LICENSES: THEIR NATURE
ENFORCEABILITY

AND

A. The Nature of Open Source Licenses
Use of the “open source” terminology can be confusing.
Sometimes open source simply refers to a basic philosophy of
freely sharing ideas, research, and materials. In this usage, people
“open source” everything from classroom materials to information
about distant solar systems.10 Other times open source refers to the
software development model that is typically used in the open
source community. In that model, a programmer creates software
and posts the source code on the Internet, and a community grows
up around the software as developers exchange bug fixes and new
features.11 For purposes of this Article, however, the term open
source refers to licensing software under open source licensing
principles. Although open source licensing used to be obscure,
many commentators now have described its nature and purposes.12
In open source licensing the word “source” refers to
software in its source code form. Programmers write software in
source code form using a computer language such as Basic or C.
Anyone proficient in the computer language can read and
understand the source code.13
The word “open” refers to the Open Source Definition
(OSD).14 An organization called the Open Source Initiative15
10

See generally CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE (2008).
11
See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004).
12
See generally HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE:
UNDERSTANDING RISKS AND LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES (2008); LAWRENCE
ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2005); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License
Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications
for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185 (1999) [hereinafter “How Copyleft
Uses License Rights”].
13
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243
(3d Cir. 1983) (describing source and object code).
14
See Ken Coar, Open Source Initiative, THE OPEN SOURCE DEFINITION,
http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd (last visited May 24, 2011).
15
Michael Tiemann, Open Source Initiative, ABOUT THE OPEN SOURCE
INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/about (last visited May 24, 2011).
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created the OSD, which sets out general principles that a license
must meet to be considered open source. For example, the OSD
requires that an open source license grant the unencumbered right
to use, make modifications, and distribute the licensed software.16
The Free Software Foundation (FSF) prefers the term “free” rather
than “open” to emphasize that the goal is to keep the software “free
as in freedom.”17 Some programmers use the term “FOSS” to refer
to free and open source software. Other names for open source
licenses include “public,” “community,” “copyleft,” and “share
and share alike.”18 From here, this Article adopts the FOSS
nomenclature.
FOSS stands in contrast to binary use software (BUS),19
typically called proprietary20 or commercial21 software, which is
software licensed in object code form primarily for end use only.22
Binary (or object) code is software in machine-readable form that
cannot be understood by humans. When distributed in binary form,
software retains the secrecy of its inner workings (bolstered by
provisions in the license contract against decompiling); this is
important because some programmers view these inner workings
as a valuable trade secret.23 Beyond retention of trade secrets,
programmers employ BUS licensing because so few software users
have skill or interest in looking at or modifying source code.24
16

Id.
See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Why “Free Software” is Better than “Open
Source,” in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M.
STALLMAN 55, 56–58 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002).
18
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Debugging Open Source Software Licensing,
64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 76 n.8 (2002) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Debugging];
see also Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (referring to
“public” licenses); Richard M Stallman, What is Copyleft?, in FREE SOFTWARE,
FREE SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 89-90 (describing “copyleft” licenses).
19
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free
Software Movement’s Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2005)
(introducing the “BUS” nomenclature and explaining how it provides the most
useful contrast to the open source software nomenclature).
20
“Proprietary” is misleading in that open source licensing relies on a
proprietary right, namely copyright. As open source programmers like to put it,
you need a copyright before you can have a copyleft.
21
“Commercial” is misleading because many open source programmers make a
business of it. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source
Software Hackers: MySQL and Its Dual Licensing, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. &
TECH. J. 203, 205–07 (2004). Richard Stallman advocates against use of the
“commercial” terminology as well. Richard M. Stallman, Words to Avoid, in
FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 187.
22
Not surprisingly, the FOSS community refers to BUS code as “non-free” or
“closed source.”
23
See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 522.
24
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of
Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.
J. 335, 360-61 (1996).
17
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Despite the differences between FOSS and BUS, they share
one important characteristic: a copyright on the software code,
combined with a license of the code, creates the legal framework
for the transaction model.25 As one prominent open source group
says: “To stay free, software must be copyrighted and licensed.”26
FOSS relies on license contracts and so does BUS; they only differ
in the particular contract terms used.27
Software developers who license BUS use a wide variety of
license contracts with their software.28 When it comes to FOSS
license contracts, the Open Source Initiative has approved over 70
licenses as complying with the OSD.29 Despite this diversity,30
most open source programmers use31 either the GPL32 or some
variation of the BSD License.33

25

Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights, supra note 12, at 185–86,
189–94.
26
What Does Free Mean? Or What Do You Mean by Free Software?, DEBIAN
GROUP, http://www.debian.org/intro/free (last visited May 24, 2011).
27
There are many similarities in the terms as well, including warranty
disclaimers, limitations of liability, and choice of law. Gomulkiewicz, How
Copyleft Uses License Rights, supra note 12, at 185-93 (1999). Indeed, some
BUS license contracts also grant rights to source code and allow derivative
works. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 531–32.
28
The software industry calls these end user license agreements (EULAs) or
mass-market software licenses; in popular terminology, shrinkwrap or clickwrap
licenses. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
2002); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). See generally Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing
For Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz,
Getting Serious].
29
Open Source Licenses, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE,
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.html (last visited June 24, 2011).
30
For a discussion of whether this proliferation of licenses represents a positive
or negative development, see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License
Proliferation: Helpful Diversity or Hopeless Confusion?, 30 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 261(2009) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License
Proliferation].
31
Evidence of this can be found by checking license use statistics on popular
open source code repositories such as SourceForge, http://sourceforge.net/ (last
visited June 24, 2011), and FreshMeat, Statistics,
http://freshmeat.net/search?q=statistics&submit=Search (last visited June 24,
2011).
32
For instance, Linus Torvalds licenses the Linux kernel under GPL 2.0. See
Steven Vaughan-Nichols, The Linux Operating System Will Remain Under
Version 2 of the General Public License Rather than Migrate to GPLv3,
According to the Kernel's Creator, EWEEK.COM (Jan. 26, 2006),
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/Torvalds-No-GPL-3-forLinux/.
33
In addition, the Apache Foundation licenses its Apache web server under a
permissive license like the BSD License.
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B. The Enforceability of Open Source Licenses
Until the Federal Circuit decided Jacobsen v. Katzer,
hackers and commentators had long debated the enforceability of
FOSS licenses.34 These debates centered on two aspects of
enforceability. First, did FOSS licenses hold together as
enforceable contracts based on their offer, acceptance, and
consideration? And second, would courts enforce the terms of
FOSS licenses with injunctive relief? The Federal Circuit answered
a resounding “yes” to both questions in Jacobsen v. Katzer.
In addressing whether FOSS licenses hold together as
enforceable contracts, the Federal Circuit focused on the question
of whether adequate consideration had been exchanged. The court
ruled that the exchange of non-monetary consideration easily and
appropriately provided adequate consideration: “The choice to
exact consideration in the form of compliance with the open source
requirements of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than
as a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal
recognition.”35 Professors Robert Hillman and Maureen O’Rourke,
authors of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Software
Contracts,36 concur that FOSS licenses provide adequate
consideration to form a contract. 37
The Jacobsen court did not address the adequacy of the
licensee’s opportunity to review and manifest assent to the license
because it was not contested. That is not surprising. In most FOSS
licensing contexts, notice and assent will not be an issue because
users of open source code know the ground rules. As such, and in
light of liberal modern rules of contract formation, most
commentators agree that FOSS licenses should not be
unenforceable on grounds of inadequate offer and acceptance.38
34

See generally Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and
Enforcing Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
443 (2005).
35
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The open source
license at issue in the Jacobsen case was the Artistic License which emphasizes
attribution of the original author’s work and disclosure of changes made to the
work by subsequent authors.
36
Am. Law Inst., PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2009). See generally
Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay on the Challenges of Drafting a Uniform Law
of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 925 (2006).
37
See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in
the Electronic Age, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (2009).
38
See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License
Contracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
335, 346 (2009) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants]; Daniel
B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Development: The Enforceability of
Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶¶ 81-82 (2000);
Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA
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Focusing on the issue of enforcing FOSS licenses via
injunctive relief, the Federal Circuit ruled that injunctive relief is
available when a licensee exceeds the scope39 of a license grant.40
This ruling followed the approach of other U.S. federal courts in
copyright licensing cases.41 According to the Federal Circuit,
“[c]opyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude;
money damages alone do not support or enforce that right.”42 The
Federal Circuit explained how injunctive relief is particularly
appropriate for FOSS licenses where the software is often provided
to the public at no charge.43 Injunctive relief44 is a particularly
critical remedy because the standard remedy for breach of contract,
monetary damages, normally is beside the point in FOSS
licensing.45 Instead, FOSS licensors hope to prevent further
copying, distribution, or modification of their software by those
who fail to abide by open source license terms or, better yet, to
obtain an affirmative injunction to require public release of the

COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 473-75 (2005). See generally
Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious, supra note 28 (describing how, despite
scholarly criticism, courts generally uphold the enforceability of mass market
software licenses when licensors provide a reasonable opportunity to review
license terms and the licensee provides a meaningful manifestation of assent);
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60 (2006) (“Every
court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . enforceable. A
majority of courts in the past ten years have enforced shrinkwrap licenses.”).
39
Examples of exceeding the scope of a license in the open source licensing
context might include, for example, failing to release source code, failing to
provide attribution, or failing to specify changes made to the underlying
software.
40
Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at1382 (“Indeed, because a calculation of damages is
inherently speculative, these types of license restrictions might well be rendered
meaningless absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief.”).
41
See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th
Cir. 1994); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1989).
42
Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381–82.
43
Id. at 1382.
44
The licensor might seek other copyright remedies as well, such as
impoundment or destruction of infringing software, statutory damages, enhanced
damages for willful infringement, and attorneys’ fees. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et
seq. (2006) (describing remedies for copyright infringement).
45
Making money is not necessarily beside the point. See RICHARD STALLMAN,
Selling Free Software, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 65
(“Many people believe that the spirit of the GNU project is that you should not
charge money for distributing copies of software, or that you should charge as
little as possible—just enough to cover the cost. Actually, we encourage people
who redistribute free software to charge as much as they wish or can . . . .
Distributing free software is an opportunity to raise funds for development.
Don’t waste it!”). Open source is now big business for many companies,
including IBM, Google, RedHat, and Intel. Rather than charge royalties, these
companies charge for hardware, services, value-added BUS software, and
advertising.
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licensee’s source code46 or proper attribution.47 As articulated by
the Federal Circuit, “these types of license restrictions might be
rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce through
injunctive relief.”48
II.

END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND
COPYRIGHT FIRST SALES: THE VERNOR TEST AND
ITS INCONVENIENT COMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN
SOURCE LICENSING

A.

Defining Copyright First Sales

The Supreme Court articulated the copyright first sale
doctrine in the 1908 case Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.49 According to
the Court, a copyright holder’s exclusive right to distribute copies
ends for any given copy after the owner’s sale of that copy.50
Congress codified the first sale doctrine the year after BobbsMerrill.51 Now codified in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, the
modern first sale doctrine allows the “owner of a particular copy”
to sell or dispose of the copy without the copyright holder’s
permission.52
The first sale doctrine only applies to owners of copies; it
does not apply to a person who possesses a copy without owning
it, such as a licensee.53 A licensee only has permission to use or
distribute a copy as spelled out in the license agreement. As a
consequence, a court’s evaluation of whether a given transaction is
a license or a first sale is critical to determining whether someone
can claim the benefits54 of the first sale doctrine. But, in practice,
46

For example, the GPL requires licensees to publicly release the source code of
any work based on the licensor’s work, which the licensee distributes. See GNU
General Public License 2.0, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, Sections 2 and 3,
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html (last visited December 24, 2011).
47
See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376.
48
Id.
49
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
50
Id. at 350-51.
51
17 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
52
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
53
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2010); see 17
U.S.C. § 109(d) (2006); Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350; cf. Quality King
Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146-47 (1998).
54
This Article does not delve into the spirited debate about the relative benefits
of licenses versus first sales. Many commentators have weighed in on that topic.
See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on
the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 891 (1998) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product];
Anne Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in IPR Licensing:
Contracting Around “First Sale” in Multilevel Production Settings, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1149 (2011); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright
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this evaluation is difficult to make—not every transaction that a
software vendor labels as a “license” qualifies and some
transactions that do not mention the word “license” explicitly still
should be treated as licenses under the law. Courts have developed
tests for making the evaluation, and the MDY Trio provides a
current example.
B.

The First Sale Versus EULA Debate

While sales of goods dominated the economy in the
industrial age, now we live in an information economy dominated
by software and information products.55 Sales contracts no long
provide the primary transaction model. Instead, software and
information producers often use licenses.56 Licenses underlie two
important aspects of the information economy. First, they enable
creators and inventors to share intellectual property and collaborate
in the development of new works and products, from the
production of complex software to the creation of new multimedia
works. Second, licensing (including the use of EULAs) enables
parties of all sizes to bring information products to market through
many different channels, in a multitude of configurations, and at a
variety of price points.57
Despite the importance and ubiquity of licensing in the
software industry, there has been a long-running debate about the
enforceability of EULAs. Commentators have criticized EULAs on
numerous grounds, but despite fierce academic criticism, courts
have enforced EULAs on a regular basis.58 One aspect of this
Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245
(2001); Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of
Contract, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason
Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011); R. Anthony Reese,
The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577
(2003); Michael Seringhaus, Comment, E-Book Transactions: Amazon
“Kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147 (2009);
Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93
(2006). For a pragmatic approach to choosing a license or a first sale as a
transaction model depending upon the circumstances, see ROBERT W.
GOMULKIEWICZ, XUAN-THAO NGUYEN & DANIELLE CONWAY, LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & APPLICATION 473-74 (2d ed. 2010). See also
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114-15 (outlining the policy pros and cons of licenses and
first sales).
55
NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 2-3, 511-12.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious, supra note 28 (describing the various
criticisms of EULAs and showing that, despite scholarly criticism, courts
generally uphold the enforceability of mass market software licenses when
licensors provide a reasonable opportunity to review license terms and the
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debate relates to whether EULAs simply can be ignored because
mass-market software transactions really amount to first sales
rather than licenses.59 Whether this claim is correct, categorically
or in any given case, depends on the test for determining whether a
EULA-based transaction presents a license or first sale
transaction.60
The “is it really a license?” issue arises in a variety of
contexts in the software industry,61 three of which are useful to
highlight for purposes of providing background for the MDY Trio.
Some of the earliest cases arose in what I will call the
“unbundling” context. Some software publishers distribute
packages or suites of software at a discount compared to the price
of the individual components. Sometimes a party in the chain of
distribution unbundles the software packages to sell the
components separately, hoping to profit from the higher prices that
can be charged for the individual components. Software vendors
use license contracts to prevent this unbundling. Courts have
enforced these licenses on many occasions62 although not when the
transaction more resembled a first sale than a license.63
A second context deals with limitations placed on software
use. A common example is discounted software licensed for
academic use only.64 Another common example is software
licensee provides a meaningful manifestation of assent); Lemley, supra note 39,
at 459-60 (“Every court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . .
enforceable. A majority of courts in the past ten years have enforced shrinkwrap
licenses.”).
59
See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1106-07.
60
See infra for a discussion of the MDY Trio’s test.
61
Increasingly, patent law’s “first sale” doctrine, known as “patent exhaustion,”
has become important in software licensing transactions. See Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008); see also Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature
and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199 (2009) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz,
Licensing Law Jurisprudence] (analyzing the Quanta case in the context of the
license transaction at issue); Amelia S. Rinehart, Contracting Patents: Modern
Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483 (2010).
62
See, e.g., Apple, Inc., v. Pystar Corp., 92 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1917 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2000); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995)
(unbundling operating system software from computer hardware); Microsoft
Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, In., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (same).
63
See, e.g., SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075
(C.D. Cal. 2001). Sophisticated software publishers can avoid the result in
SoftMan by observing more careful and robust licensing practices, as outlined
for example in the Stargate case. See generally Christian H. Nadan, Software
Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” Really Sales and How
Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555 (2004) (commenting
on the practical implications of the SoftMan and Stargate cases).
64
See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 20-21.
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licensed at one price for business use and at a lower price for
personal use.65 And a final example is software licensed for
evaluation purposes only.66 The litigation in MDY Industries v.
Blizzard Entertainment arose in the context of use restrictions in
Blizzard Entertainment’s EULA for its software and online gaming
service. In MDY, the license prohibited World of Warcraft gamers
from using robots to play the game in order to advance to higher
game levels and acquire additional game assets.67 If the software
had been sold as a copyright first sale rather than licensed, then the
end user could ignore the use limitations.68
A third context concerns EULA restrictions imposed on end
user redistribution of the software. These restrictions are often
placed on high priced software;69 EULAs for many consumeroriented, mass-market software products allow redistribution (so
long as the original user does not keep a copy).70 If a software
transaction is fundamentally a first sale rather than a license, then
the software may be freely transferred even if a EULA purports to
say otherwise. The dispute in Vernor v. Autodesk arose in this
context. We turn now to the Vernor case because that is where the
Ninth Circuit announced its test for distinguishing between
licenses and first sales, with its inconvenient complications for
open source licensing.
C. The MDY Trio’s License Test and Its Inconvenient
Complications for Open Source Licensing
1. Vernor v. Autodesk’s Test For Distinguishing First
Sales From Licenses
Autodesk, Inc. develops computer-aided design software
called “AutoCAD” which is used by manufacturers, architects, and
engineers. Autodesk provides AutoCAD to its customers pursuant
to a EULA. This license prohibits transfer of the software without
Autodesk’s permission.71 Without permission, one of Autodesk’s
customers sold copies of AutoCAD to Mr. Vernor who, in turn, re65

See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Arizona Retail Sys. Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz.
1993); cf. UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (music
CD sent for evaluation purposes).
67
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010).
68
Note that there was no issue about notice of or assent to the EULA. MDY, 629
F.3d at 928. The sole defense was that the EULA could be ignored because of
the first sale doctrine.
69
See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (regarding
the AutoCAD software at issue).
70
See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 24, at 357 n.89.
71
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105.
66
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sold the copies on eBay. Litigation ensued and Mr. Vernor
argued72 that Autodesk could not enforce its prohibition on the
transfer of copies of AutoCAD because Autodesk’s right to control
distribution was exhausted under the first sale doctrine.73 The
District Court agreed with Mr. Vernor, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, relying on its MAI Trio of cases.
The Ninth Circuit spelled out the distinction between a
license and a first sale in two separate parts of its opinion. In the
first instance, the court read its United States v. Wise74 and the MAI
Trio precedents to “prescribe three considerations that we may use
to determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than an
owner of a copy.”75 The court went on to list the considerations:
“First, we consider whether the copyright owner specifies that a
user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether the
copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer
the software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner
imposes notable use restrictions.”76 Later in the opinion, the court
recapitulated these considerations, seemingly turning them into a
test: “We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than
an owner of a copy where the copyright owner: (1) specifies that
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s
ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use
restrictions.”77
Although unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the court
noted that the legislative history of both Section 109 and Section
117 of the Copyright Act supported its conclusion.78 It also
rejected the argument that Bobbs-Merrill79, the common law
predecessor to Section 109(a), compelled a different conclusion:
Decided in 1908, Bobbs-Merrill did not and could not
address the question of whether the right to use
software is distinct from the ownership of copies of
software. Moreover, the Supreme Court in BobbsMerrill made it explicit that its decision did not
address the use of restrictions to create a license.80

72

Note that Mr. Vernor was aware of AutoCAD’s EULA so there was no
argument that he lacked notice of the license terms. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105.
73
Id.
74
United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
75
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-1111.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1111.
78 .
Id. at 1112.
79
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
80
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114. Cf. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research
Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146-47 (1998) (“[T]he first sale doctrine would not
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Finally, the court noted that both sides had mustered
important policy arguments in favor of their positions, but that
these arguments “do not alter our conclusion that our precedent
from Wise through the MAI Trio requires the result we reach.”81
2. Inconvenient
Licensing

Complications

for

Open

Source

At first glance, Vernor’s license test works well for many
software licensors. Most BUS licensors provide their software
under license models that readily fall within the Ninth Circuit’s
definition of a license transaction. Indeed, the court found that
Autodesk’s license met its definition.82 However, complications
arise for open source licensing.
FOSS licenses do not “significantly restrict” the user’s
ability to transfer the software.83 Open source licensing does not
restrict transfer at all; in fact, FOSS licenses affirmatively grant the
unencumbered freedom to transfer the software.84 Free
transferability of software, in both source and object code forms,
lies at the very heart of open source licensing.85
In addition, FOSS licenses do not “impose notable use
restrictions.” For instance, the GPL says that it does not limit use
in any way.86 The BSD license essentially tells the licensee “you
can do anything you want with the software” and does not restrict
use in any way, shape or form.87
The basic flaw in the Vernor license test is that it assumes
software licenses only grant fewer rights than a first sale would
provide a defense to a §602(a) action against any non owner such as a bailee, a
licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful.”).
81
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1115.
82
By contrast, a music company’s attempt to “license” promotional CDs did not
meet the test. See UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1179-83.
83
This may also be a complication for BUS. As mentioned, many BUS licenses
permit transfer of the software although the transfer often comes with certain
conditions that could be called restrictions, such as the condition that the
transferor inform the transferee of the terms of the license, that the transferee
agrees to abide by the terms of the license, and that the transferor transfer all
physical copies and documentation to the transferee. Do these conditions
“significantly restrict” the ability to transfer BUS licenses? The answer seems to
be “yes” based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MDY Industries. See MDY
Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added).
84
See THE OPEN SOURCE DEFINITION, supra note 14, at Section 1.
85
Id.
86
See GPL 2.0, supra note 46, at section 0; GNU General Public License
Version 3, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, Section 2,
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt (last visited May 24, 2011).
87
See Gomulkiewicz, Debugging, supra note 18, at 93.
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provide. A first sale, of course, is not a sale of the copyright itself
and can best be characterized as a limited license, namely
permission to use and redistribute one copy of a work.88 Often
software licenses grant more rights than a first sale would provide;
open source licensing presents the classic case. Even in BUS
licensing, the license tends to provide a package of rights, in some
respects granting less than first sale rights (e.g., by restricting use
or transferability) and in other respects granting more than first
sale rights (e.g., rights to create derivatives or make additional
copies).89
The best way to reconcile the Vernor test with FOSS
licensing is to read the Vernor license test as one way, but not the
only way, to prove that a transaction is a license. In other words, if
a transaction meets the Vernor test it certainly qualifies as a
license; however, there may be other ways to demonstrate that a
transaction is a license, such as by showing that the user received
permission to exercise more copyrights than the user would have
under a first sale. If the user gets more rights, then clearly the
transaction is not a first sale. This interpretation of the license test
is consistent with language in the early part of the Vernor opinion,
which sets out “three considerations that we may use to determine
whether a software user is a licensee” (emphasis added). Perhaps
that is precisely what the Vernor court intended90—but even if it
did not, that seems the better approach for future Ninth Circuit
panels and other Circuits to adopt.
In practice, the mismatch between FOSS license principles
and the Vernor license definition probably amounts to a
complication in theory only for FOSS licensors. Defendants raise
first sale as a defense in lawsuits in which the plaintiff challenges a
user’s unauthorized distribution or use of its software. Rarely, if
ever, will a defendant need to assert a first sale defense in an FOSS
licensing context because these licenses grant unbounded rights to
use and transfer the software. Nonetheless, the open source
complication helpfully illustrates that the Vernor license test will
prove inadequate in many software licensing contexts. End user
software licenses provide a more complex transaction model than
the court’s test accounts for.91
88

In the software context, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) provides additional rights
relating to archival copies and copies made as an essential step to using the
software.
89
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 54;
Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 24.
90
See Nimmer, supra note 54, at 1341.
91
As more software and information transactions occur digitally and do not
involve physical copies (e.g., cloud computing), some scholars predict that the
first sale doctrine will become less and less relevant as time goes by. See Aaron
Perzanoski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011).
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From a policy point of view, the Vernor case continues the
trend followed by most courts in the United States of upholding a
software developer’s ability to use mass market end user licensing
as a transaction model92 rather than characterizing most end user
transactions as copyright first sales as urged by some scholars.93
Indeed, FOSS licensing is but one of the many valuable software
licensing practices that benefit from a policy that upholds licensing
as a transaction model. Of course, as demonstrated by the UMG
Recordings v. Augusto case in the MDY Trio, not all transactions
bearing the “license” label will or should be so characterized.94
However, many software licenses will meet the Vernor test (as
modified by my proposal above), thus enabling flexibility,
diversity, and choice in the software industry, including the
creative distribution and collaboration models provided by FOSS
licensing. As the court put it in Jacobsen v. Katzer, “[o]pen source
licensing has become a widely used method of creative
collaboration that serves to advance the arts and sciences in a
manner and at a pace that few could have imagined a few decades
ago.”95
III.

MDY’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN COVENANTS AND
CONDITION:
INCONVENIENT
AND
DIRE
COMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN SOURCE LICENSING

While the Vernor license test may be an inconvenient
complication for FOSS licensing in name only, the MDY case’s
complication related to the covenant/condition distinction is dire.
Breach of a license condition differs from breach of a pure
92

See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004);
Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Specht v.
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Micro Star v. Formgen
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1455 (7th Cir. 1996); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month
Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); I-A Equip. Co., Inc. v. I-Code,
Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co.,
Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000).
93
E.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule: Are
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004); Winston, supra
note 54; see also Cody Gillians, Recent Development, Is This Mine or Yours?
The Effect of the Rulings in Vernor v. Autodesk and The Library of Congress on
the Determination of Who Owns Software Copies, 12 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 205
(2010) (criticizing the Vernor court’s approach to the license/first sale
distinction because it makes it easier to characterize transactions as licenses).
94
See UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1179-83.
95
535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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contractual covenant because when a licensee fails to abide by a
license condition, the licensee not only breaches the software
contract, but also infringes the licensor’s intellectual property
rights.96 Thus, the distinction between license conditions and pure
contractual covenants97 affects whether a FOSS licensor can get
copyright remedies, especially injunctive relief, the critical remedy
in most open source settings. Jacobsen v. Katzer did not provide
much guidance on when a license term falls into one category or
the other.98 Most importantly, the court did not address the extent
to which the parties, by careful drafting, can dictate or influence
the categorization.99 This Section describes the general distinction
between contractual covenants and license conditions. Then, it sets
out the MDY case’s approach to making the distinction. Finally, the
Section critiques the MDY approach and argues for the adoption of
a different framework.
A.
Illustrating the Distinction Between Contractual
Covenants and License Conditions
Software contracts contain a collection of terms that
describe the contractual relationship between a licensor and
licensee with respect to the licensor’s software. We normally call
this entire contract a “license” but, to be more precise, we should
call it a “license contract” because it contains not only a
permission-granting license100 but also other contractual terms
such as choice of law, payment, and warranties.101 The license
grant portion of the contract consists of both a grant of rights under
the licensor’s intellectual property and any conditions that the
licensor chooses to impose on that grant. These license conditions
create the parameters for exploitation of the licensor’s intellectual
property rights.
96

See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th
Cir. 1994); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1989);
Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 483–84 (5th Cir.
1981).
97
See generally Yamini Menon, Jacobsen Revisited: Conditions, Covenants,
and the Future of Open Source Licensing, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 311
(2011).
98
The final word from the Jacobsen v. Katzer court on the distinction is,
essentially, that context matters. Referring to an attribution requirement, the
court in a footnote said that failure to provide attribution only triggers a
copyright infringement if so provided in the license. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382
n.5.
99
I discussed this issue at length in an article published before the court decided
the MDY Trio. See Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants, supra note 38.
100
See Tips v. U.S., 70 F.2d 525, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1934) (license is a
“permission”).
101
See Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants, supra note 38, at 346.
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Sometimes identifying a license condition will be easy.
Many complex license contracts have an entire section devoted to
describing license conditions and the section is labeled as such.
Often license drafters use words such as “provided that,” “only if,”
or “on condition that” to signify that the license grant contains
conditions.102 For example, the BSD License’s license grant states,
“Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, are permitted provided that the following
conditions are met . . . .” The “share alike” license grant of GPL
2.0 states, “You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or
any portion of it . . . and copy and distribute such modifications or
work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that you also
meet all these conditions . . . .”103
Other terms in license contracts clearly are identifiable as
pure covenants because they do not bear directly on the grant of
rights. As mentioned previously, choice of law clauses, payment
provisions, and warranties and disclaimers of warranty typically
fall into the category of contractual covenants. An interesting open
source-related example comes from the newest version of the GPL,
GPL 3.0 (GPLv3).104 GPLv3 contains a provision whose purpose
is to thwart the use of digital rights management (DRM)
technology.105 Let’s call this the “Anti-DRM Section.” The AntiDRM Section follows a provision labeled “2. Basic Permissions”
and comes before provisions labeled “4. Conveying Verbatim
Copies,” “5. Conveying Modified Source Versions,” and “6.
Conveying Non-Source Forms.”106 The latter four provisions
clearly read like license grants with accompanying license
conditions. The Anti-DRM Section, though nested in the midst of
licenses, is not connected to the licenses in any obvious way.107
Thus, it appears to be a standalone contractual covenant.
102

See id. at 348.
GNU General Public License 2.0, supra note 46, at Section 2.
104
See Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or
Breaking the FOSS Movement?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265
(2008); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0,
24 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 15 (2007).
105
See GNU General Public License Version 3, supra note 86, at Section 3.
106
Id. at Sections 2, 4–6.
107
One possibility is that Section 8, “Termination,” ties the DRM Clause to the
license grants. It provides: “You may not propagate or modify a covered work
except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to
propagate or modify it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights
under this License (including any patent licenses granted under the third
paragraph of section 11).” GNU General Public License Version 3, supra note
105, at Section 8. However, the best reading of this provision is that it is simply
a garden variety termination provision, providing that, in the event the licensee
breaches the license contract, the licensee has no further rights to exercise the
rights granted in the license grant provisions. Another possibility is Section 9,
103
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Sometimes the license contract’s plain wording does not
clearly identify whether a particular provision is a license
condition or a pure covenant.108 In that situation, courts will try to
determine the intent of the parties.109 If in doubt, however, courts
presume that a provision is a pure covenant rather than a license
condition.110
Sometimes the issue is not ambiguity—it’s that very clear
drafting has framed a provision that is normally a pure covenant as
a license condition. To illustrate, assume that the Free Software
Foundation (“FSF”) decided to revise the current Anti-DRM
Section by adding the following language to the Anti-DRM clause:
“The licenses in Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 are expressly conditioned
on your compliance with the terms and conditions of Section 3
[The Anti-DRM Section].” On the surface, the FSF has re-drafted a
pure covenant into a license condition.
Consider a second illustration concerning royalty-related
provisions.111 A BUS license may contain a term that requires
payment of a certain royalty. By contrast, some FOSS licenses
prohibit royalties, such as GPLv3 in its § 10. Both of these royaltyrelated provisions normally would be considered contractual
covenants. However, the license contract could be drafted to make
the license grant conditional on either the payment or non-payment
of royalties. In the context of a hypothetical BUS license: “Subject
to the timely payment of royalties under the license contract,

“Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.” Midway through Section 9 it
says, “However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to
propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you
do not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a covered
work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so.” Id. at § 9. In
context, the best reading of this provision is that it serves three purposes: first, it
explains what actions signify manifestation of assent to the license contract;
second, it explains the consequences if you do not manifest assent; and third, it
serves as friendly advice that no license is needed to simply receive or run the
software.
108
See Harmon Cable Comm. v. Scope Cable Television, 468 N.W.2d 350, 358
(Neb. 1991) (“Courts have struggled for centuries with differentiating between
conditions and promises.”).
109
See, e.g., Henning v. Mainstreet Bank, 538F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2008). See
also Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that
context matters).
110
See Grand Union Co. v. Cord Meyer Dev. Co., 761 F.2d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir.
1985).
111
Normally “permission precedes payment.” Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus.
Mgmt. Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 534 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see also
Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v.
Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 753–54 (11th Cir. 1997).

127

14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)

2011-2011

licensor grants you the following rights . . . .”112 Or, in the context
of a re-drafted GPLv3: “Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 are expressly
conditioned on your compliance with the requirements in Section
10.” Taken at face value, clever drafting successfully changed
these royalty-related covenants into a license conditions.
It is against this complex backdrop that the Ninth Circuit in
the MDY case created its test for distinguishing between pure
covenants and license conditions. Next, we turn to the MDY case
and its test, followed by a critique of that test and a proposal for a
different approach.
B.
MDY’s Approach to the Covenant/Condition
Distinction and Its Complications
In the MDY case, the court examined whether the
defendant’s violation of Blizzard Entertainment’s EULA (which
governs its World of Warcraft software) and its Terms of Use
(which govern the corresponding online gaming service) infringed
Blizzard’s copyrights. The court’s decision turned, in part, on
whether the EULA or TOS terms that the defendant violated were
contractual covenants or license conditions.113
The court held that copyright infringement may occur “only
where the licensee’s action (1) exceeds the license’s scope (2) in a
manner that implicates one of the licensor’s exclusive statutory
rights.”114 Addressing purported license grant conditions, the court
went on to conclude that “for a licensee’s violation of a contract to
constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between
the [license] condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights under
copyright.”115 The court emphasized the need to ground copyright
infringement in this way: to hold otherwise would allow any
software copyright holder to “designate any disfavored conduct
during software use as copyright infringement by purporting to
condition the license on the [licensee’s] abstention from the
disfavored conduct.”116
Many purported license conditions in FOSS licenses would
not be classified as such under the MDY approach, even though the
license drafters clearly intended to treat them as license conditions
and they are fundamental to open source licensing. For example,
112

See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir.
2003) (concerning a license grant that provided: “subject to [Media 100] timely
paying all amounts owing hereunder, upon payment of the $75,000 license fee”).
113
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir.
2010).
114
Id. at 940.
115
Id. at 941.
116
Id.

128

ENFORCEMENT OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LICENSES:
THE MDY TRIO’S INCONVENIENT COMPLICATIONS
the Artistic License 1.0’s attribution conditions arguably fall into a
gray area because they relate to moral rights117 but not directly to
copying, distribution, or derivative works. Many of the “share
alike” provisions of the GPL might not qualify—they do not
invoke copyrights, and instead simply require a set of reciprocal
promises118 given in exchange for a broad license of all copyrights
(the so-called copyleft which reverses all copyrights). And finally,
it is hard to see how the BSD License’s condition that a licensee
reproduce warranty disclaimers or, for that matter, its condition
that the licensee reproduce copyright notices would qualify as a
license condition, because neither of those terms have a nexus to
“exclusive rights” under copyright as required by MDY.119
Software presents a unique complication for identifying the
nexus between a purported license condition and an exclusive
copyright because software’s very use causes multiple copies to be
made in a computer’s random access memory (RAM). If the user
acquires the software as a copyright first sale, Section 117 of the
U.S. Copyright Act provides that these RAM copies are not
infringing. By contrast, in a license transaction, the license contract
governs the making of these RAM copies during software use, so
any properly drafted condition on the license grant could be
characterized as a copyright-implicating license condition. In other
words, in the software context, the parties could have considerable
flexibility about whether to characterize a term as a covenant or a
condition.
Rather than wrestle deeply with this issue,120 the MDY court
brushed it off with a terse policy observation: “The rationale would
117

Protection of moral rights under copyright law is relatively weak in the
United States, relating primarily to the visual arts. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 8D.02[D][2] (2005); see also IRINI
A. STAMATOUDI, COPYRIGHT AND MULTIMEDIA PRODUCTS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 160–64 (2002) (discussing varied treatment of moral rights as they
relate to software); MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS 283-318 (2011)
(same).
118
For example, in exchange for the license grant, the licensee agrees to release
source code and relicense royalty free on the same terms as the GPL. While
these conditions do have something to do with copyright, they do not place
direct conditions on copying, distribution, or the creation of derivative works.
119
See MDY, 629 F.3d at 941; see also Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l,
Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 487 (5th Cir. 1981). But see County of Ventura v. Blackburn,
362 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1966); National Comics Publications v. Fawcett
Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951). In addition, the requirement to
retain copyright notices may be largely superfluous after passage of 17 U.S.C. §
1202 (b), which prohibits the removal of copyright management information
such as copyright notices.
120
For example, the court could have revisited the oft-criticized MAI Systems v.
Peak Computer decision, which treats RAM copies as infringing copies. See
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Melissa
A. Bogden, Comment, Fixing Fixation: The RAM Copy Doctrine, 43 ARIZ. ST.
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be that because the conduct occurs while the [licensee’s] computer
is copying the software code into RAM in order for it to run, the
violation is copyright infringement. This would allow software
copyright owners far greater rights than Congress has generally
conferred on copyright owners.”121 Taken literally, this observation
is not correct. Software copyright holders who use licenses simply
do not have “greater rights” than other copyright holders—all
possess the same exclusive statutory rights and the same remedies
for breach of those rights.
To be fair, perhaps the MDY court is suggesting that
software licensors may have a greater ability to enforce their
copyrights for breach of a license contract if they have greater
flexibility to create license conditions than other copyright
licensors. The critical word, however, is “may.” Remedies
ultimately come down to what a court will award, especially when
it comes to affirmative or emergency injunctive relief. If courts
exercise caution in granting injunctive relief122 for breach of a
license condition that is not well grounded in copyright law or
policy, then, in practice, software copyright holders will have little
or no greater power than other copyright holders.
To complicate matters further, the MDY court carved out a
sui generis exception for monetary payments: “A licensee arguably
may commit copyright infringement by continuing to use the
licensed work while failing to make required payments, even
though a failure to make payments otherwise lacks a nexus to the
licensor’s exclusive statutory rights.”123 The court justified its
exception “because of the distinct nexus between payment and all
commercial copyright licenses, not just those concerning
software.”124
The court appears to be saying that license grants which are
conditioned on the payment of money may be remedied by
copyright remedies even though payments are not grounded in
copyright’s exclusive rights. The court’s rationale for its sui
generis exception is a bit obscure because it uses the word “nexus”
twice but in two different senses. The best reading seems to be that
if all copyright licenses (software as well as non-software) could
benefit from conditioning license grants on payment, then the
L.J. 181 (2011); Daniel J. Buller, Note, Copyright Infringement in the Ether:
RAM Buffering and the Copyright Act’s Duration Requirement, 59 U. KANS. L.
REV. 659 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1067 (2010).
121
MDY, 629 F.3d at 941.
122
Or any other copyright remedies, for that matter. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505
(2006) (describing remedies such as statutory damages, seizure of infringing
copies, and attorneys’ fees).
123
MDY, 629 F.3d at 941 n.4.
124
Id.
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court’s concern about “far greater rights” accruing to software
licensors would not come into play. However, software and nonsoftware commercial copyright licenses share many terms in
common, not just payment.125 Under the court’s reasoning could
these “in common” terms also be drafted as copyright-invoking
license conditions?
Moreover, the court’s sui generis exception disfavors
licenses, such as FOSS licenses,126 for which payment is not the
operative consideration. After MDY, parties can draft a license so
that the payment of royalties is treated as a license condition,127 but
they cannot draft a license where “payment” of non-monetary
consideration (such as attribution or “share alike”) is a license
condition.128 Neither contract nor copyright policy justifies
favoring
monetary
consideration
over
non-monetary
consideration.129 Such a distinction even runs afoul of the court’s
concern about giving some copyright licensors “far greater rights”
than others, but, ironically, the court’s exception favors
commercial non-software licensors over non-commercial open
source software licensors.
C.
A Multifactor, Sliding Scale Approach that
Addresses the MDY Complication
The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to limit the ability of copyright
licensors to turn contractual covenants into license conditions is
based on a sound policy concern, namely the fear of unduly
extending copyright’s power through contracts, especially in the
context of software licenses. Unfortunately, the court’s approach
encroaches on three competing policies, namely authorial control,
certainty in contracting, and the freedom of contracting parties to
structure their transactions and allocate risk as they think best
under the circumstances. There is a better way to balance all of
these important copyright and contract policies.
125

See generally GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., supra note 54, at 51-80 (chapter
discussing terms common in most license contracts).
126
“There are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation
and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that range far
beyond traditional license royalties.” Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
127
See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir.
2003) (“[S]ubject to [Media 100] timely paying all amounts owing hereunder,
upon payment of the $75,000 license fee. . . .”).
128
Furthermore, it is doubtful that a licensor could create a license condition
based on a promise not to charge a royalty such as the critical license condition
of this nature found in the GPL.
129
Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382.
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The difficulty with the MDY approach is that it places so
much emphasis on identifying the absolute definitional boundary
between contractual covenants and license conditions,130
determined by examining the “grounding” in or “nexus” with
copyright’s exclusive rights. The trial court faces a high stakes
“either/or” choice based on relatively sketchy criteria; if the court
lands on the side of defining a given license agreement term as a
contractual covenant, the copyright holder cannot receive
injunctive relief.131
There is a better way to utilize the “grounding” and “nexus”
criteria identified in the MDY decision. The better approach is to
shift the focus to the remedies aspect of the case. Leading up to
and following the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v.
MercExchange,132 there has been a renewed appreciation for the
impact of remedies in intellectual property cases,133 particularly as
they relate to maintaining a fair balance in the intellectual property
bargain between exclusive rights and public use.134 I propose what
I will call a “sliding scale” approach to contrast it with the MDY
court’s “either/or” approach, applied when a licensor seeks
injunctive relief.
It makes more sense for courts to use the “grounding” and
“nexus” criteria as critical factors in deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief, based on a sliding scale. Indeed, this is precisely
130

Determining this boundary is notoriously difficult. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 12.01[A] at 12-5 (2010); Omri
Ben-Shahar, Damages For Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 11-13 (2011).
131
See David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 207, 216 (2010) [hereinafter McGown, Tory Anarchism] (pointing out the
issue in harkening back to and criticizing the 9th Circuit’s decision in Sun
Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999)).
132
547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
133
See Orit F. Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2011).
134
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, supra note 130; Engey Elrefaie, Injunctive Relief
Post eBay and the Various Applications of the Four-Factor Test in Differing
Technological Industries, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 219, 239 (2010); H.
Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1197 (2008) (arguing that the historical record suggests that in copyright
cases legal remedies (damages) were deemed categorically inadequate); David
McGowan, Irreparable Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577 (2010)
[hereinafter McGowan, Irreparable Harm]; ; Jake Phillips, Comment, eBay’s
Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Property Rules Give Way to Liability
Rules, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405 (2008); Pamela Samuelson & Krzystof
Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright
Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 67 (2010).
To sample cases and commentary prior to the Supreme Court’s eBay case, see
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (effect on
patent system) and Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
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when and where the condition/covenant distinction really
matters—where the proverbial rubber meets the road. In this
sliding scale approach, the more a license condition has grounding
in and nexus to copyright’s exclusive rights, the more likely it is
that the court will award injunctive relief. This relieves trial courts
of the pressure to make precise, binary “either/or” decisions about
whether a term should be called a license condition or not, and puts
trial judges in the accustomed role of using their experience135 in
evaluating and weighing a variety of facts and circumstances to
craft a nuanced remedy based on the particular ones before it.136
Indeed, trial courts should examine other copyright related criteria
and contract related factors as part of its assessment of whether
granting an injunction promotes the public interest. This respects
the Supreme Court’s reminder in the eBay case to weigh the public
interest in the injunctive relief equation. 137
From a copyright policy standpoint, trial courts should give
weight to the authorial control inherent in copyright protection,138
but courts should also examine the extent to which the license
contract fosters the creation and distribution of works. Many
135

See General Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek Electronics & Manufacturing, Inc.,
197 F.3d 83, 90 (3d Cir. 1999).
136
“Perhaps the most significant single component in the judicial decision
whether to exercise equity jurisdiction and grant permanent injunctive relief is
the court’s discretion.” WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 37-38 (1995). “[I]n most cases the determination whether to issue
an injunction involves a balancing of the interests of the parties who might be
affected….” Id. at 39. “Not surprisingly, therefore, the court’s decision depends
on the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 42. See generally MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 3d § 65.03 (2010). For a sample of district courts exercising their
discretion, see, e.g., Designer Skin, L.L.C. v. S&L Vitamins, Inc., 2008 WL
4174882 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008); Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Harry Potter Encyclopedia case); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v.
RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (website terms
of use); Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp.2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(software counterfeiting); Propet USA, Inc. v. Shugart, 2007 WL 4376204
(W.D. Wash Dec. 13, 2007). See also Coxcom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101,
112 (1st Cir. 2008).
137
Decisions about injunctive relief should include consideration of the impact
on the public interest. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (2006). See also Elrefaie,
supra note 134, at 239 (“Although the public interest factor may not be
explicitly stressed in most cases, it is a major factor in the Supreme Court’s
reversal of the Federal Circuit’s holding in eBay.”).
138
See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1375, 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(referring numerous times to the author’s need to control its works); McGown,
Tory Anarchism, supra note 131, at 222 (“[E]ven if one despises the authorial
authority embedded in property rules and presumptive injunctive relief, it is
naïve to believe that cutting back such authority inevitably yields net gains in
anything. It certainly does not produce inevitable net gains in “freedom” or
“liberty,” because the freedom to take and use comes at the expense of a
freedom to structure production and distribution as one wishes.”).
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license contracts do protect valuable authorial rights (such as moral
rights) and demonstrably provide the legal tool to increase creative
collaboration and business model innovation.139 But not all
attempts to assert authorial control via license contracts are created
equal at all times or in all settings—some promote the overall
purposes of copyright law better than others.140
From a contract policy standpoint, as mentioned, license
contracts help the parties allocate risk and provide certainty about
the terms of their business relationship.141 The MDY Trio’s test
threatens these goals in situations where the license contract has
been drafted specifically to identify a term as a license condition.
But freedom of contract is not the same at all times or in all
settings. As suggested by the Jacobsen case, assessing “context”
factors142 matters. For example, trial courts should weigh: Did the
parties truly intend for the licensor to be able to take advantage of
copyright remedies for breach of a particular provision?143 Was the
license contract drafted clearly to reflect that fact? Was the
contract negotiated or a standard form? How sophisticated are the
parties?144 How robust was the licensee’s opportunity to review
and manifest assent?145
This multifactor, sliding scale approach has an additional
benefit: it eliminates the need for MDY’s analytically awkward sui
generis exception for monetary payments serving as license

139

See Gomulkiewicz, Licensing Law Jurisprudence, supra note 61, at 204-08
(describing how licensing can promote technological and business model
innovation).
140
Even though open source licensing often promotes the goals of copyright,
whether and to what extent this is so varies from case to case. See generally
Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 349 (2002); Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software:
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53 (2004).
141
See PCTV Gold, Inc. v. Speednet LLC, 508 F.3d 1137, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007)
(weighing freedom of contract as a public interest factor to be weighed in
assessing injunctive relief).
142
See diagram infra for examples of factors that might help the court tease out
the intent of the parties.
143
See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (sophisticated parties form license contracts with knowledge of how
remedies will operate in the context of their licenses, including possibility of
injunctive relief).
144
See Lemley, supra note 38, at 459-60 (pointing out that, surprisingly, most
EULA cases have involved sophisticated parties rather than consumers); see
also MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 935-37 (9th Cir.
2010) (litigants clearly sophisticated parties); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussed by Professor Lemley as illustrative of his
point about EULA cases).
145
See, e.g., the Register.com and MDY cases, where the licensee viewed the
EULA multiple times.
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conditions.146 Under the multifactor, sliding scale approach, a
payment-related license condition can be treated like any other
term drafted as a license condition. There will no longer be a need
for trial courts to treat royalty payments as special, unique, always
actionable conditions when other consideration-related conditions
(such as attribution, cross-licensed code, or “share alike”) fulfill
the same objective as royalties in many licenses.
Use of the multi-factor, sliding scale approach described
above can be illustrated in the diagram below:

LESS
Likelihood of Granting Injunctive Relief
MORE
Factors not favoring injunctive relief
Factors favoring injunctive relief
No © nexus
Strong © nexus
No or scant (i.e., RAM copies only) © grounding
Strong © grounding
Does not promote © policies
Promotes © policies
Not drafted as condition
Drafted as condition
Contract of adhesion
Negotiated contract
Consumer license
Business license
With this approach, licensing law can allow parties to order
their business affairs freely, rationally, and predictably by drafting
license contracts that best fit their circumstances, while keeping the
power of copyright holders in check when it comes to enforcing
the license contract. This works well for FOSS licensors, who
often can show that their specified license conditions ultimately
serve the goals of copyright law even though they may not fit
neatly into the test for license conditions set out in the MDY
case.147 Taking a fresh look at the availability of equitable relief for
breach of copyright licenses through the lens of open source
licensing seems to be just what Justice Kennedy had in mind in the
eBay case when he admonished trial courts to bear in mind the
economic impact of new ways to exploit intellectual property that
“present conditions quite unlike earlier cases.”148

146

Using the sliding scale approach, continued use of software without payment
might be enjoined in certain cases (e.g., business license, payment clearly
drafted as license condition, negotiated transaction) but not others (e.g.,
consumer license, payment not clearly drafted as license condition, contract of
adhesion).
147
See McGown, Tory Anarchism, supra note 131 (showing strong need for
authorial control in open source licensing because it increases creative works).
148
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy was talking specifically about so-called patent
trolls, but his general point goes beyond patents and the licensing practices of
patent trolls.
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For instance, in the FOSS context, a court might grant
injunctive relief149 for violating the “share alike” requirement of
the GPL or the attribution requirement150 of the Artistic License if:
(1) the licensee knew about or had a fair opportunity to review the
requirement; (2) in the text of the license, the requirement was
described as a license condition; (3) there is some grounding in or
nexus to copyright beyond RAM copies, e.g., related to the
creation of derivative works in the case of the GPL or the
protection of moral rights in the case of the Artistic License; (4) it
is a non-consumer transaction;151 or (5) it strongly promotes the
greater creation and distribution of works (key goals of
copyright).152
I conclude this Section with a brief note of caution. Even
though FOSS licensing can be a highly beneficial licensing
practice that promotes the goals of copyright, whether and to what
extent this is true varies from case to case. A decade ago, the
discussion about FOSS153 in the software industry seemed
polarized—FOSS was either the end of intellectual property or the

149

This Article does not weigh in on the important question of whether
irreparable harm should be presumed in copyright cases post-eBay. According to
some scholars, lower courts have split on the issue. See Gomez-Arostegui, supra
note 134, at 1209. For whether irreparable harm should be presumed from a
normative point of view, compare Samuelson, Why Plaintiffs, supra note 134,
with McGowan, Irreparable Harm, supra note 134.
150
See McGowan, Irreparable Harm, supra note 134, at 590 (“Although it is
often said that U.S. copyright law does not recognize moral rights as such, the
law does recognize reputation as relevant to infringement remedies and treats
reputational harm as irreparable. This is true even when the relevant aspect of
reputation is honor rather than fame . . .”); id. at 593 (“[T]he presence of
attribution requirements in even undemanding software licenses such as the
BSD, MIT, and Artistic licenses is evidence that attribution plays an important
role in the sociology of production for projects that employ such licenses (the
same is true of licenses such as the GPL, that add an ideological component to
attribution).”).
151
See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2000). In the open source context, many if not most hackers are sophisticated
about the expectations surrounding open source licenses. See generally
Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License Proliferation, supra note 30 (describing
hacker participation in the Open Source Initiative’s process of certifying licenses
as complying with the Open Source Definition).
152
See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); cf. Wallace v.
IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing how the GPL advances
competition law policies).
153
See Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software
Licensing: Moderating the Rein Over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183
(2006); David McGowan, SCO What? Rhetoric, Law and the Future of F/OSS
Production, 2-3, 14-15 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 04-9,
2004).

136

ENFORCEMENT OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LICENSES:
THE MDY TRIO’S INCONVENIENT COMPLICATIONS
savior of innovation.154 Today, a more pragmatic mood prevails.
As the use of open source licensing takes on more permutations
and as large public companies such as Apple, Amazon.com,
Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and RedHat reap great profits using
open source as part of their business model, it has become clear
that FOSS licensing is no more inherently good than BUS
licensing is inherently evil.155 Indeed, many firms now use a
combination of FOSS and BUS licensed software, leading many to
conclude that “mixed source” is the best approach.156 In the final
analysis, trial courts should soberly examine each use of FOSS and
BUS licensing in its particular context, ignoring both vaporous
platitudes157 and overwrought prognostications of doom.158
CONCLUSION
Just as quickly as Jacobsen v. Katzer seemed to create
clarity about the enforcement of open source licenses, the MDY
Trio introduced inconvenient complications. These complications
should not be surprising because they sit at the often-turbulent
intersection of copyright and contract law. We should admire the
MDY Trio’s attempt to address the tricky distinction between
copyright first sales and licenses and the elusive distinction
between contractual covenants and license conditions. Our
admiration should not get in the way of refining and adjusting the
MDY Trio’s approach, however, and that is what this Article
proposes to do.
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